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 WIN OR LOSE THE BATTLE FOR CREATIVITY:
 THE POWER AND PERILS OF INTERGROUP COMPETITION
 MARKUS BAER
 Washington University in St. Louis
 ROGER TH. A. J. LEENDERS
 University of Groningen
 GREG R. OLDHAM
 Tulane University
 ABHIJEET K. VADERA
 Indian School of Business
 Integrating and refining social interdependence theory and structural adaptation
 theory, we examined the effects of intergroup competition on the creativity of 70
 four-person groups engaged in two idea generation tasks. We manipulated both group
 membership change (change, no change) and intergroup competition level (low, inter
 mediate, high). Competition had the expected U-shaped relation with creativity in
 open (membership change) groups but failed to produce the hypothesized inverted
 U-shaped pattern in closed (no membership change) groups. In the latter, effects were
 positive for low to intermediate competition and flat for intermediate to high levels.
 Within-group collaboration mediated these effects.
 Recent economic trends demanding the delivery
 of new products and services at an ever-increasing
 speed and at higher levels of quality have encour
 aged organizations to focus on how to more effec
 tively use the creative potential of their employees.
 To ignite the creative spark heralded by many
 scholars as necessary for innovation (e.g., Van de
 Ven, 1986), organizations are increasingly relying
 not only on team-based structures (Griffin, 1997;
 Lawler, Mohrman, & Ledford, 1995; Leenders, Van
 Engelen, & Kratzer, 2007; Sundstrom, 1999), but
 also on internal competition between teams (Bir
 kinshaw, 2001; Kanter, Kao, & Wiersema, 1997;
 Marino & Z?bojn?k, 2004).
 The list of companies attempting to foster cre
 ativity?that is, ideas about organizational prod
 ucts or services that are both novel and useful
 (Amabile, 1996; Oldham & Cummings, 1996)?via
 intergroup competition is long (Peters & Waterman,
 1988). For example, discussing innovation at Rub
 bermaid, DuPont, and Fidelity, Kanter et al. (1997)
 highlighted the critical role of internal competition.
 Teams at these companies compete against one an
 other to obtain scarce resources to advance their
 new ideas, and managers often simultaneously
 charge multiple teams with pursuing the same op
 portunity to foster creativity (Birkinshaw, 2001).
 The motivating premise underlying the increas
 ing use of intergroup rivalry to stimulate creativity
 is the notion that competition adds to the positive
 tension of challenge in a group (Amabile, 1988). In
 fact, one of the long-accepted hypotheses in the
 study of group behavior is that external threats
 weld groups into tight-knit social units in which
 members view each other as interdependent and in
 a positive manner (Fiedler, 1967; Sherif & Sherif,
 1953; Staw, Sandelands, & Dutton, 1981). This, in
 turn, fosters collaboration and participation by
 blurring the distinction between self- and group
 interest (Bornstein & Erev, 1994; Kramer & Brewer,
 1984). As collaboration and participation increase,
 groups should be able to leverage the benefits asso
 ciated with bringing individuals with different
 ideas and viewpoints together while minimizing
 the process losses often plaguing group work, ulti
 mately achieving elevated creativity (Hackman &
 Morris, 1975; Taggar, 2002; Van der Vegt & Bunder
 son, 2005).
 Although this rather static view of groups and the
 way competition affects their creativity certainly
 has some validity, recent research has suggested
 that groups in organizations are best viewed as
 complex and dynamic entities that adapt and
 change over time (McGrath, Arrow, & Berdahl,
 The authors thank Stuart Bunderson and Aim?e Kane
 for their helpful comments on a draft of this article.
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 2000). In the context of creativity, change in mem
 bership composition is one particularly important
 means by which groups assemble the knowledge
 needed to maintain the ability to generate novel
 and potentially useful solutions to ever-changing
 problems (Choi & Thompson, 2005). Accordingly,
 membership change has become a reality for many
 groups (Dineen & Noe, 2003), especially those
 charged with the production of creative ideas (An
 cona, Bresman, & Kaeufer, 2002; Ancona & Cald
 well, 1998).
 What are the implications of membership change
 for the effectiveness of intergroup competition as a
 means to stimulate creativity? The purpose of the
 present study was to examine this question. Fol
 lowing social interdependence theory (Deutsch,
 1949), we suggest that enhanced participation and
 collaboration?the benefits typically associated
 with increasing intergroup competition in a static
 context (one in which no change in groups' mem
 bership occurs)?result in elevated group creativ
 ity. However, refining the implications of social
 interdependence theory, we hypothesize that there
 are limits to the creative benefits that can be ex
 pected from instilling a cooperative mind-set via
 intergroup competition and that fierce rivalry (i.e.,
 an increase in intergroup competition from an in
 termediate to a high level) may even undermine
 creativity by constricting collaboration.
 We also adopted structural adaptation theory
 (Beersma et al., 2009; Johnson, Hollenbeck, Hum
 phrey, Ilgen, Jundt, & Meyer, 2006), a theoretical
 framework suggesting that groups experience more
 difficulty in adopting a cooperative mind-set to
 ward (past) competitors than in shifting from a
 cooperative to a competitive mind-set. Thus, we
 suggest that groups exchanging a member with a
 competing group may have difficulty harvesting
 the creative benefits typically (i.e., under noncom
 petitive conditions) associated with membership
 change (Choi & Thompson, 2005; Nemeth & Orm
 iston, 2007; Ziller, Behringer, & Goodchilds, 1962).
 However, refining structural adaptation theory, we
 hypothesize that this phenomenon?termed "cut
 throat cooperation" (Johnson et al., 2006)?is lim
 ited to circumstances in which competition in
 creases from low to intermediate levels and can be
 overcome in a fiercely competitive intergroup en
 vironment. Specifically, we argue that facing fierce
 intergroup rivalry (i.e., competition increasing
 from intermediate to high levels) provides groups
 with the impetus to expend the effort and energy
 necessary to reconfigure their within-group struc
 tural arrangement to accommodate a newcomer
 and thereby harvest the creative benefits typically
 associated with the arrival of a new member.
 Our research makes a number of valuable contri
 butions to the extant literature. First, despite the
 apparent appeal of intergroup competition as a ve
 hicle for promoting creativity, few previous studies
 have systematically examined the effects of inter
 group competition on group creativity (see Beersma
 and De Dreu [2005] for an exception). Hence, it is
 not at all clear what the implications of competi
 tion are when it comes to this important outcome
 variable and whether the widespread use of inter
 group competition to promote creativity in contem
 porary organizations is justified. Our study is one
 of the few attempts to shed light on this question.
 Second, recognizing the dynamic nature of
 groups in organizations, we consider both inter
 group competition and membership change simul
 taneously. In addition to examining the effects of
 competition in both static (no membership change)
 and dynamic (membership change) contexts, we
 refine social interdependence theory and structural
 adaptation theory by examining the possibility that
 the pattern of effects in both contexts is contingent
 upon the level of intergroup competition?that is,
 the pattern expected to emerge as intergroup com
 petition increases from low to intermediate levels
 reverses when competition increases from interme
 diate to high levels.
 Third, illuminating the mechanisms transmitting
 the complex, interactive effects of intergroup com
 petition and membership change on group creativ
 ity, we examine collaboration, both in terms of idea
 generation and decision making, as a potential me
 diator. Thus, our study provides some insights into
 the within-group processes shaping creativity un
 der varying levels of intergroup competition and in
 both static and dynamic contexts.
 CONCEPTUAL DEVELOPMENT
 AND HYPOTHESES
 Applying Social Interdependence Theory and
 Structural Adaptation Theory: Linear Effects of
 Intergroup Competition and Membership Change
 on Creativity
 Before outlining our theoretical arguments, we
 define the key concepts. Membership change oc
 curs when a new member joins and an existing
 member departs a group (Choi & Thompson, 2005;
 Ziller, 1965). Like Choi and Thompson (2005), we
 define "open groups" as those that experience
 membership change (i.e., departure of a member
 combined with the simultaneous arrival of a new
 member) over the course of a series of tasks and
 "closed groups" as those that remain stable in
 membership over a similar course.
This content downloaded from 202.161.43.77 on Tue, 12 Jun 2018 05:53:09 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 2010 Baer, Leenders, Oldham, and Vadera 829
 Following social interdependence theory (Deut
 sch, 1949), we define intergroup competition as a
 social situation in which the goals of different
 groups are linked in such a way that goal achieve
 ment by any one group reduces the ability of other
 groups to reach their respective goals. Social inter
 dependence theory is one theoretical perspective
 that allows us to elucidate the potential effects of
 intergroup competition on creativity, particularly
 when groups are closed. In essence, this theory
 suggests that whether people perceive their goals to
 be positively or negatively related has important
 implications for the way they interact and, ulti
 mately, for their performance (Johnson, 2003).
 With reward structures assumed to be the pri
 mary determinant of individuals' perceptions of
 goal interdependence, one of the implications of
 social interdependence theory is that reward
 structures designed to facilitate competition be
 tween groups (i.e., structures that foster positive
 interdependence between individuals, goals) are
 likely to promote within-group collaboration,
 among other factors.
 We define within-group collaboration as the ac
 tive participation of all group members in collabo
 rative idea generation (i.e., developing, sharing,
 and attending to others' ideas) and decision making
 (i.e., deciding which ideas to pursue and which to
 abandon) (Taggar, 2002). Active and equal partici
 pation by all members in both collaborative idea
 generation and making collective decisions regard
 ing those ideas has been suggested to enhance the
 creativity of groups (e.g., Gilson & Shalley, 2004;
 Hargadon & Bechky, 2006; Larson, 2007; Vera &
 Crossan, 2005). For example, previous research has
 suggested that group creativity is only likely to
 flourish when members not only generate ideas
 themselves but also share their ideas (i.e., make
 them available to others) and carefully attend to
 and actively process the ideas of others (Brown,
 Turneo, Larey, & Paulus, 1998; van Knippenberg,
 De Dreu, & Homan, 2004). Only when ideas are
 communicated, attended to, and actively pro
 cessed, is it likely that members will generate new
 associations in areas they did not previously con
 sider, build on others' contributions, or combine
 them with ideas of their own (Paulus & Yang, 2000;
 Shin & Zhou, 2007)?all of which are essential for
 truly creative ideas to emerge (Hargadon & Bechky,
 2006). As increasing rivalry with other groups en
 hances within-group collaboration and thus pro
 vides members with the impetus to not only gener
 ate ideas themselves but to also share their ideas
 and to actively attend to the ideas of others, in
 creasing competition should foster the creativity of
 closed groups (Amabile, 1988; Clydesdale, 2006).
 Unfortunately, few previous studies have explic
 itly examined the effects of intergroup competition
 on group creativity. One notable exception is a
 recent study by Beersma and De Dreu (2005). Par
 tially supporting the notion that intergroup compe
 tition stimulates creativity in closed groups, these
 authors showed that groups that competed against
 other groups during a negotiation exercise subse
 quently produced advertising slogans that were
 rated as more useful than those produced in groups
 in which members competed against each other.
 However, in contrast to the notion that intergroup
 rivalry fosters creativity, Beersma and De Dreu's
 results indicated that groups in which members
 competed against each other generated slogans that
 were rated as more original than those developed
 by groups that competed against other groups. As
 this study contrasted intergroup competition with
 within-group competition, rather than distinguish
 ing between different levels of intergroup competi
 tion, the results only tangentially speak to the re
 search question addressed in the current study.
 Moreover, previous work on the effects of inter
 group rivalry on a variety of other group outcomes
 has found support for the notion that intergroup
 competition can foster collaboration and better per
 formance (e.g., Bornstein & Erev, 1994; Erev, Born
 stein, & Galili, 1993). For example, Mulvey and
 Ribbens (1999) found that intergroup competition
 increased productivity and decreased inefficiency.
 Although social interdependence theory has im
 portant implications for understanding how groups
 respond in terms of creativity to increasing inter
 group rivalry in static environments, it fails to ad
 dress explicitly how groups faced with a change in
 membership may respond to increasing competi
 tion. To address this shortcoming, Johnson et al.
 (2006) recently proposed structural adaptation the
 ory as an expansion of social interdependence the
 ory to dynamic contexts. At the heart of this theory
 is the notion of "asymmetric adaptability," the idea
 that it is more difficult for groups to shift from a
 competitive to a cooperative mind-set than it is to
 do the reverse. Introducing the concept of "cut
 throat cooperation," according to which the type of
 cooperation seen among past competitors is differ
 ent from the type of cooperation observed in groups
 that have only worked cooperatively in the past,
 Johnson et al. showed that groups that switched
 from a competitive to a cooperative mind-set exhib
 ited performance that mirrored that of competitive
 rather than cooperative groups. These groups had
 difficulty adopting their structural arrangement to
 the change in reward structure and continued to
 engage in their habitual interaction patterns. In par
 ticularly, after switching to intergroup competition
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 these groups appeared to struggle with sharing
 task-relevant information, an indication of reduced
 collaboration.
 Developed to explain how groups adapt to
 changes in reward structures (from competitive to
 cooperative and vice versa), structural adaptation
 theory also has important implications for under
 standing creativity in groups that experience mem
 bership change under varying levels of intergroup
 competition. Specifically, resembling a group un
 dergoing archange in reward structure, a group that
 exchanges a member with a rival group faces the
 challenge of shifting from a competitive to a coop
 erative mind-set with respect to the newcomer. Ac
 cording to structural adaptation theory, under such
 circumstances groups are likely to suffer from cut
 throat cooperation, experiencing disruptions to
 group performance owing to difficulty overcoming
 the previously competitive attitude toward the new
 member. Because of this "us-versus-the-new
 comer" mind-set, both collaborative idea genera
 tion and participative decision making are likely to
 suffer, with lowered group creativity ultimately re
 sulting. This logic suggests that under conditions of
 increasing intergroup competition, membership
 change may undermine collaboration, particularly
 with respect to newcomers. However, exhibiting a
 collaborative attitude toward the newcomers is es
 sential, as previous research has shown that intro
 ducing new members from other groups not only
 infuses groups with new perspectives but also pro
 vides them with opportunities for social learning,
 which can foster creativity (Choi & Thompson,
 2005). Hence, instead of promoting these benefits,
 membership change under conditions of intergroup
 rivalry may limit the extent to which groups engage
 in collaborative idea generation as well as partici
 pative decision making and essentially result in the
 groups not taking advantage of some of their mem
 bers, all of which should eventually decrease group
 creativity. Thus, although membership change has
 been demonstrated to positively affect creativity in
 noncompetitive environments, in which open
 groups regularly outperform closed groups (Choi &
 Thompson, 2005; Ziller et al, 1962), the arrival of
 new members from competing groups may become
 a liability eventually undermining group creativity.
 Although we are not aware of any study that has
 explicitly examined the effects of intergroup com
 petition on the creativity of open groups, a number
 of studies have highlighted the problems arising
 from newcomers joining existing groups (e.g.,
 Gruenfeld, Martorana, & Fan, 2000; Lewis, Belli
 veau, Herndon, & Keller, 2007). For example, Horn
 sey, Grice, Jetten, Paulsen, and Callan (2007) dem
 onstrated that criticisms and recommendations for
 change were received with more negativity and
 were less influential when introduced by a new
 comer than by an existing member of a group.
 Refining Social Interdependence Theory and
 Structural Adaptation Theory: Quadratic Effects
 of Intergroup Competition and Membership
 Change on Creativity
 Thus far, we have argued that increasing compe
 tition may stimulate the creativity of closed groups
 but undermine the creativity of open groups. In the
 following section, we argue that the effects of inter
 group competition on creativity depend not only
 on membership change but also on the level of
 competition.
 Following social interdependence theory, we
 suggested that collaboration in closed groups ben
 efits from increasing intergroup rivalry, resulting in
 elevated levels of creativity. Although this logic is
 valid for some levels of competition (i.e., competi
 tion increasing from low to intermediate levels), it
 may be that beyond some optimal, intermediate
 level increasing competition corrodes group cre
 ativity by constricting the recognition and consid
 eration of alternative ideas (i.e., collaborative idea
 generation) and reducing participative decision
 making. This theorizing is consistent with the cen
 tral tenets of the threat-rigidity perspective, accord
 ing to which groups tend to respond to threats,
 such as fierce intergroup competition, with re
 stricted information processing and centralization
 of decision-making authority (Staw et al., 1981).
 Similarly, work on the trade-off between social
 control and creativity in groups (Nemeth & Staw,
 1989) has suggested that social pressures, such as
 those that may result from groups operating in a
 fiercely competitive environment, may corrode cre
 ativity by curtailing divergent thinking (Wiekens &
 Stapel, 2008) and restricting group members' ex
 pression of new ideas and the extent to which other
 group members act upon them (Goncalo & Staw,
 2006)?that is, collaborative idea generation is re
 stricted. Thus, although low to intermediate inter
 group rivalry may weld groups together, thereby
 fostering collaboration and thus creativity, the in
 creased gravitational pull that results from inter
 group competition becoming increasingly fierce
 may undermine creativity by limiting the extent to
 which groups engage in collaborative idea genera
 tion and participative decision making (King &
 Anderson, 1990; Woodman, Sawyer, & Griffin,
 1993). This line of argument suggests that the ef
 fects of intergroup competition on creativity in
 closed groups will be positive up to intermediate
 levels, after which they are expected to become
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 negative; an inverted U-shaped function will be the
 result.
 We have also argued that intergroup competition
 reduces creativity in open groups because of prob
 lems associated with cutthroat cooperation, partic
 ularly with respect to newcomers. According to
 structural adaptation theory, underlying cutthroat
 cooperation is the problem that shifting from a
 competitive to a cooperative mind-set requires sig
 nificant effort and energy resources?more effort
 and resources than are needed when groups shift
 from a cooperative to a competitive mind-set. Thus,
 for a group to overcome the problems associated
 with cutthroat cooperation, its members have to be
 motivated to invest the resources necessary to re
 configure their within-group structural arrange
 ment to accommodate a newcomer, thereby har
 vesting the creative benefits typically associated
 with the arrival of a new member. Of course, inter
 group competition is likely to provide such an im
 petus as long as the benefits associated with in
 creasing competition (e.g., being number one)
 outweigh the costs of realigning a group's structural
 arrangement. This logic suggests that although at
 lower levels of competition the costs associated
 with structurally reconfiguring a group to accom
 modate a newcomer may outweigh the benefits fol
 lowing from competition, the opposite may be true
 when competition becomes increasingly fierce.
 This suggests that the problems associated with
 cutthroat cooperation may be limited to circum
 stances in which competition increases from low to
 intermediate levels and can be overcome by creat
 ing a fiercely competitive environment. Thus, we
 expect the effects of intergroup competition on the
 creativity of open groups to be negative up to inter
 mediate levels, after which they should become
 positive. A U-shaped function will be the result.
 Overall, we propose:
 Hypothesis 1. Membership change moderates
 the quadratic effects of intergroup competition
 on group creativity in such a way that the ef
 fects describe an inverted U-shaped function
 in the case of closed groups and a U-shaped
 function in the case of open groups.
 The Mediating Role of Collaboration
 Finally, we argue that collaboration (the active
 participation of all group members in the collabo
 rative idea generation and decision-making pro
 cess) may mediate the joint, quadratic effect of in
 tergroup competition and membership change on
 group creativity. As mentioned earlier, for creativ
 ity in groups to flourish it is imperative not only
 that group members actively generate ideas but also
 that they share their ideas and attend to the ideas of
 others (Brown et al, 1998; Paulus, 2000; van Knip
 penberg et al, 2004). Only when ideas are commu
 nicated, carefully attended to, and actively pro
 cessed, is it likely that members generate new
 associations in areas they did not previously con
 sider, build on others' contributions, or combine
 them with ideas of their own (Paulus & Yang, 2000;
 Shin & Zhou, 2007)?all of which are vital for truly
 creative ideas to emerge (Hargadon & Bechky,
 2006). In addition, active member participation in
 decision making ensures that multiple perspectives
 and opinions regarding which ideas to pursue and
 which to abandon are being discussed and consid
 ered. Discussing and considering decision-relevant
 information, in turn, is likely to ensure high de
 cision quality, thereby allowing groups to focus
 their attention and time on those ideas that have
 the greatest promise to be novel and potentially
 useful.
 These arguments suggest that collaborative idea
 generation and decision making are likely to affect
 group creativity positively. In addition, we have
 argued that intergroup competition and member
 ship change are likely to have joint effects on col
 laborative idea generation and decision making.
 Specifically, in keeping with social interdepen
 dence theory, we suggested that collaboration in
 closed groups benefits from increasing intergroup
 rivalry, at least up to some intermediate level of
 rivalry. However, extending social interdepen
 dence theory, we hypothesized that as competition
 becomes increasingly fierce, collaboration and de
 cision-making authority grow constricted. In keep
 ing with structural adaptation theory, we hypothe
 sized that open groups operating in a competitive
 environment suffer from cutthroat cooperation, at
 least as long as competition does not exceed inter
 mediate levels. However, once intergroup rivalry
 becomes sufficiently fierce, competition provides a
 group with the necessary impetus to expend the
 effort and energy necessary to reconfigure its struc
 tural arrangement to accommodate a newcomer.
 Together, then, these arguments suggest that collab
 oration on idea generation and decision making is
 likely to mediate the joint effects of intergroup
 competition and membership change on creativity.
 Thus,
 Hypothesis 2. Collaboration in idea generation
 and decision making mediates the joint qua
 dratic effects of intergroup competition and
 membership change on group creativity.
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 METHODS
 Experimental Design and Participants
 We used a three-by-two (3 X 2) between-partici
 pants design (intergroup competition: low, inter
 mediate, or high by membership change: closed vs.
 open), including a control group (no competition,
 closed). Participants were 280 undergraduate stu
 dents at a large university. Their average age was 21
 years; 49 percent were men; and 75 percent were
 business majors. Participants were randomly as
 signed to 70 four-person groups, which were then
 randomly assigned to the experimental conditions
 (10 groups per condition). In return for their participa
 tion, participants earned class credit and were eligible
 for cash prizes (see "Competition Mampulation").
 Experimental Tasks
 Groups completed two idea generation tasks
 (tasks 1 and 2), in between which 50 percent of the
 groups (excluding the control groups) experienced
 a change in membership. For both tasks, groups
 assumed the role of a four-person task force that
 was assigned by the College of Business the mis
 sion of developing a strategy to make the university
 more attractive to students. The specific goal of the
 mission was to generate creative (i.e., original and
 potentially useful) ideas that addressed two issues
 related to student life: (1) improving the transition
 from high school to college for entering students
 and (2) improving the quality of life for students
 once they arrived on campus.
 For participants to produce creative ideas, they
 needed to find these tasks at least moderately in
 teresting (McGraw, 1978; Shalley & Oldham, 1997).
 To examine the level of interest in the tasks, we
 conducted a pretest with 63 undergraduate stu
 dents. Participants first read a description of the
 two tasks. Next, using a scale ranging from
 "strongly disagree" (1) to "strongly agree" (7), they
 rated the tasks on two items developed for this
 study: "I would be interested in completing the
 tasks described in this scenario" and "I find
 the tasks described in this scenario interesting."
 The interitem reliability estimate for this measure
 was satisfactory (a = .80), and we created an index
 by averaging scores for the two items. A mean rat
 ing of 5.10 (s.d. = 1.31) indicated that participants
 perceived the tasks to be moderately interesting,
 thereby suggesting their suitability for eliciting cre
 ative responses during the experiment.
 Procedures
 To allow for the manipulation of membership
 change, we ran two groups simultaneously in dif
 ferent rooms. Both were assigned either to the
 closed condition or to the open condition. Upon
 participants ' arrival in the reception area of the
 laboratory, an experimenter randomly assigned
 them to one of the two four-person groups. To
 foster distinct group identities, different colors
 were associated with the two groups, and members
 were instructed to write their first names on name
 tags that matched the color of their group (Kane,
 Argote, & Levine, 2005). Participants were then in
 structed to go to their respective rooms and to com
 plete the first section (containing a consent form and
 questions about their background) of a booklet. After
 six minutes, the experimenter entered the first room
 and read aloud the instructions for the first task. In all
 conditions, the instructions were identical, apart
 from the competition manipulations. Specifically, we
 told all groups that there was a chance that a group
 member would be asked to switch groups after the
 first task. We indicated that in actual organizations,
 membership in task forces often changes over time
 and that we wanted to simulate such group recompo
 sition in the laboratory (Choi & Thompson, 2005). In
 keeping with accounts of brainstorming in organ
 izations, in our instructions we highlighted the
 importance of the groups producing truly cre
 ative ideas suitable for subsequent adoption (Sut
 ton & Hargadon, 1996).
 We asked groups to list their ideas for the first
 task in a booklet that was located at the center of
 the table around which members sat. The experi
 menter then left the room and repeated the instruc
 tions to the second group in the adjacent room.
 After 15 minutes, the experimenter reentered both
 rooms and instructed groups to complete the next
 section of their booklets, which contained the first
 manipulation check. The experimenter then ran
 domly selected a member from each group in the
 open group condition and asked him or her to
 switch rooms and to join the other group. Groups in
 the closed condition received no such instruction.
 Thus, groups in the open condition consisted of
 three original members and one newcomer after the
 member recomposition, and groups in the closed
 condition continued with the same members who
 had worked together on the first task.
 Following this, the experimenter read aloud the
 instructions for the second task and then repeated
 the competition manipulations. In all conditions,
 the level of competition was identical for both tasks
 and for both teams that competed against each
 other. The groups then worked for 15 minutes on
 the second task. After this time period, participants
 completed the final section of their booklets, con
 taining the second manipulation check. We then
 debriefed and dismissed participants.
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 Competition Manipulation
 Competition arises from the confluence of sev
 eral factors, including evaluation, reward, and a
 win-lose aspect that is unique to competitive situ
 ations (Amabile, 1996). We manipulated the win
 lose aspect by creating what Deutsch termed "con
 triently interdependent goals" (1949: 132). With
 such goals, achievement by any one group reduces
 other groups' ability to reach their goals. In line
 with this definition, we elicited increasing levels of
 intergroup competition by reducing the proportion
 of groups that, given goal accomplishment by any
 one group, could simultaneously reach that same
 goal. Specifically, we told participants in the low
 competition condition that their opportunity to win
 a cash prize and to have their ideas forwarded to
 the associate dean of the College for further consid
 eration required their group to be among the top 50
 percent of the most creative groups in the experi
 ment. We told participants in the intermediate
 competition condition that their opportunity to win
 a cash prize and to have their ideas forwarded
 required their group to be among the top ten cre
 ative groups in the experiment. We informed the
 members in the high competition condition that
 their opportunity to win a cash prize and to have
 their ideas forwarded required their group to be the
 number one creative group in the experiment.
 Addressing the evaluation and reward aspects of
 competition, we told groups that we would deter
 mine the top-performing groups by evaluating the
 creativity of the ideas developed by each group in
 response to both tasks 1 and 2 (see Beersma, Hol
 lenbeck, Humphrey, Moon, Conlon, & Ilgen, 2003;
 Kane et al., 2005). Groups judged to have creative
 ideas were eligible for cash prizes that would be
 shared equally among the members. Specifically,
 groups in the low, intermediate, and high compe
 tition conditions were eligible for cash prizes of $4,
 $40, and $400, respectively. In addition, we told
 those in the high competition condition that each
 member of the winning group would receive a let
 ter of appreciation from the associate dean. The
 control groups did not operate under a win-lose
 structure, and there was no mention of financial
 rewards or idea evaluation. Instead, we told the
 participants in the control condition that we would
 combine the ideas generated by all groups in re
 sponse to both tasks and then forward these ideas
 to the associate dean for further consideration.1
 Measures
 Creativity. We developed our measure of creativ
 ity following a two-step procedure. In the first step,
 three external raters (i.e., graduate students in the
 area of organizational behavior) underwent training
 conducted by one of the authors. As have previous
 researchers (Amabile, 1996; Baer & Oldham, 2006),
 we defined creativity as ideas that are both novel
 and potentially useful. After being presented with
 this definition, the raters were instructed to indi
 vidually rate approximately 5 percent (randomly
 selected) of the ideas generated by all groups for
 each of the two tasks using a scale ranging from
 "not at all creative" (1) to "extremely creative" (9).
 After completing their individual evaluations, the
 three raters jointly discussed their ratings and re
 solved any discrepancies.
 In the second step, the three raters were in
 structed to independently rate all ideas generated
 by all groups in response to both tasks. The ideas
 were presented in random order but separately for
 tasks 1 and 2. We asked the raters to rate each idea
 on the same scale described above. To construct
 our measures of creativity, we averaged the ratings
 of the three raters for each idea. To examine
 whether aggregation was justified, we calculated
 the median interrater agreement coefficient (ivg[;];
 1 Although the use of rewards to elicit different levels
 of intergroup competition is consistent with the litera
 ture (e.g., Amabile, 1996), our systematic variation of the
 size of the financial reward with different levels of com
 petition may raise concerns regarding whether any ob
 served effects are due to intergroup competition or to the
 increasing monetary incentive. To address this issue, we
 subsequently collected data from an additional ten
 groups (in the closed condition). Like our high competi
 tion groups, these groups were offered the opportunity to
 earn a $400 reward. However, in contrast to the groups in
 the high competition condition, these additional groups
 were told that we would award the $400 on the basis of
 their absolute creativity rather than their creativity rela
 tive to other groups. If our effects were a result of the size
 of the financial incentive rather than competition, we
 would expect the opportunity to earn a $400 reward
 without the win-lose aspect that is unique to competition
 to produce results similar to those obtained in our high
 competition condition. If, however, the results mirrored
 those of our control condition, we could conclude that
 effects were the result of competition and not the size of
 the financial incentive. Comparing both the level of per
 ceived competition and creativity between the financial
 reward/no competition condition and the control and the
 high competition conditions showed that the new con
 dition (means = 2.71 and 5.73) produced results that
 mirrored those in the control condition (means = 2.64
 and 5.60, > .05) rather than those in the high compe
 tition condition (means = 3.74 and 6.60, < .05). Thus,
 it appears that our manipulation was successful and that
 observed effects can be attributed to competition rather
 than the increasing value of the financial incentive.
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 James, Demaree, & Wolf, 1984) and two intraclass
 correlation coefficients (ICC[2,1] & ICC[2,?];
 McGraw & Wong, 1996; Shrout & Fleiss, 1979).2 All
 measures were acceptable, suggesting adequate lev
 els of agreement and reliability, thereby justifying
 aggregation of ratings across raters {rwg[3] = .80;
 ICC[2,1] = .37; ICC[2,3] = .64) (Bliese, 2000; Le
 Breton & Senter, 2008).
 Organizations are generally not interested in
 groups generating a large number of only mediocre
 ideas but instead typically charge their project
 groups with producing a few great ideas that are
 suitable for further development and later imple
 mentation (Cooper, 2001; Sutton & Hargadon, 1996;
 Wheelwright & Clark, 1992). In keeping with this
 emphasis, in our instructions we highlighted the
 importance of groups producing truly creative
 ideas suitable for subsequent adoption by the Col
 lege of Business, rather than a large number of
 ideas. Given these instructions, in operationalizing
 creativity we focused on groups' most creative ideas
 as opposed to their fluency (i.e., number of nonredun
 dant ideas) or average creativity (Rietzschel, Nijstad,
 & Stroebe, 2006). Specifically, we identified the idea
 (or ideas) that received the highest creativity rat
 ings from the three raters and then took this score to
 represent a group's creativity.
 Collaboration. To derive indicators of both col
 laborative idea generation and decision making, we
 video-recorded the group interaction process dur
 ing both tasks. Two additional raters (again, organ
 izational behavior graduate students), who were
 blind to the experimental conditions and the hy
 potheses of the study, coded the videotapes. To
 examine the effects on the mediating variable of not
 only intergroup competition but also membership
 change?an intervention that occurred after groups
 completed their first task?we instructed raters to
 only code the group interaction process during the
 second task. Unfortunately, of the 70 video record
 ings, 35 were not usable owing to technical diffi
 culties with one of the two video cameras. Fortu
 nately, however, the 35 recorded interactions
 captured groups in each condition (i.e., half of the
 total number of groups in each condition were
 available). A single rater coded these interactions.
 To establish agreement and reliability, we had a
 second rater code a (random) subset of 15 groups.
 Given the high levels of agreement and reliability
 (see below), we used the ratings of the rater who
 had coded all recordings in our analysis.
 Collaborative idea generation captures the extent
 to which all group members actively participate in
 their group's idea generation effort; that is, it taps
 the extent to which members not only generate and
 share ideas but also attend to others' ideas and con
 sider them as valuable inputs into their own genera
 tive processes. Accordingly, after being presented
 with this definition, coders indicated the number of
 members in each group who actively participated in
 idea generation (mean = 3.43, s.d. = 0.88). To deter
 mine interrater agreement for this count variable, we
 calculated the correlation between the scores of the
 two raters. It was positive and significant (r = .78, <
 .01), indicating adequate agreement.
 To capture participative decision making, we
 asked the coders to rate a single item assessing the
 extent to which decision-making authority was
 equally distributed among the members of each
 group (1, "strongly disagree," to 7, "strongly
 agree"): "Everyone in the group had the same say?
 there was no one who dominated the decisions that
 were made" (mean = 4.97, s.d. = 1.25). We exam
 ined convergence between raters by estimating the
 median rwg[i] coefficient for the 15 groups as well as
 two ICCs. All three measures were acceptable, sug
 gesting adequate levels of agreement and reliability
 (*Vg[2] = -88; ICC[2,1] = .52; ICC[2,2] = .68).
 Since both variables were substantially correlated
 (r = .57, < .01), we combined them, after standard
 ization, to create an index [a = .73). We termed this
 index "collaboration" as it captured both the extent to
 which a group's members collaborated on generating
 ideas and the extent to which the decision-making
 process within the group was collaborative?that is,
 shared among all members of the group.
 Manipulation Check
 After completing task 1 and again after task 2,
 participants responded to four questions developed
 for this study using a scale ranging from "strongly
 disagree" (1) to "strongly agree" (7): "This assign
 ment created quite a bit of competition between my
 own group and the other groups that participated in
 this study," "This assignment involved very little
 competition between the groups that took part in
 2 Following Shrout and Fleiss (1979), the first number in
 each bracket indicates whether the ICC is based on a one
 way (1) or two-way (2) analysis of variance (ANOVA). We
 used a one-way ANOVA in cases in which each target was
 rated by a different set of k judges, randomly selected from
 a larger population of judges (i.e., manipulation check rat
 ings). We used a two-way ANOVA when each target was
 rated by the same set of k judges, randomly selected from a
 larger population of judges (i.e., creativity and participative
 decision-making ratings). The second number in each
 bracket indicates whether the unit of analysis is an individ
 ual rating (1) or the mean of several ratings [k) {k = 3 for
 creativity; k = 2 for participative decision making; k = 4 for
 perceived intergroup competition).
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 TABLE 1
 Cell Means and Standard Deviations for Creativity and Collaboration as a Function of Intergroup Competition and
 Membership Change3
 Intergroup Competition
 Low Intermediate High
 Membership
 Variables Change Mean s.d. Mean s.d. Mean s.d.
 Creativity Closed 5.42 0.82 6.43 1.14 6.60 0.97
 Open 6.77 0.94 5.90 0.67 6.83 0.86
 Collaboration Closed -0.25 1.17 0.82 0.34 0.06 0.34
 Open 0.00 0.75 -0.47 0.93 0.11 0.80
 a The means and standard deviations in the closed groups/low competition condition are based on the values of two conditions, the
 control condition (means = 5.60 and -0.31, s.d.'s = 0.84 and 1.08 for creativity and collaboration, respectively) and the low competition
 condition (means = 5.23 and -0.20, s.d.'s = 0.80 and 1.38 for creativity and collaboration, respectively).
 this study" (reverse-scored), "There was a good
 deal of competition about which group produced
 the most creative idea," "While completing this
 assignment, I felt a high degree of competition."
 The interitem reliability estimates for this measure
 were satisfactory (a's = .80 and .81 for tasks 1 and
 2, respectively), and we created indexes by averag
 ing scores on the four items for both tasks 1 and 2.
 Since we measured perceived intergroup compe
 tition at the individual level, we aggregated it to the
 group level by averaging scores for the members of
 each group. Estimates of interrater agreement were
 acceptable; the median rwg[4] across the 70 groups
 was .86 for both tasks 1 and 2. Reliability (ICC[1,1] = .23
 and .17; ICC[1,4] = .54 and .44 for tasks 1 and 2,
 respectively) was also acceptable. These statistics
 justified aggregation of group members' ratings.
 RESULTS
 Manipulation Checks
 An ANOVA conducted on the manipulation
 check measures yielded statistically significant
 main effects for tasks 1 and 2 (F[3, 66] = 13.46, <
 .01, 2 = .38, and F[3, 66] = 6.95, < .01, 2 = .24).
 Planned comparisons between the four different
 groups, however, indicated no statistically signifi
 cant differences between the control and the low
 competition conditions for tasks 1 and 2 (f[66] =
 1.62, > .05, and t[66] = 0.82, > .05). Thus, we
 combined the control and low competition groups
 in subsequent analyses.3
 An ANOVA conducted on the manipulation
 check measures comparing the now three levels of
 competition yielded statistically significant main
 effects (F[2, 67] = 18.30, < .01, 2 = .35, and F[2,
 67] = 10.14, < .01, 2 = .23 for tasks 1 and^2,
respectively). The planned comparisons between
 the low and intermediate groups (i[67] = 3.44, <
.01, and t[67] = 2.31, < .05), the low and high
 groups (?[67] = 5.94, < .01, and ?[67] = 4A7, <
 .01), and the intermediate and high groups (?[67] =
2.28, < .05, and ?[67] = 1.97, < .05) were
 statistically significant for both tasks 1 and 2. In
 keeping with our manipulation, groups in the low
 competition condition reported the lowest level of
 competition (means = 2.72 and 2.78 for tasks 1 and
 2, respectively), followed by the groups in the in
 termediate (means = 3.32 and 3.21) and in the high
 competition conditions (means = 3.75 and 3.61).
 These results suggested that our manipulation was
 successful and, because there were no statistically
 significant interactions involving the membership
 change variable, we felt confident that the manip
 ulations had the intended effects.
 Descriptive Statistics
 To examine the effects of membership
 change?an intervention that occurred after groups
 completed their first task?we used the creativity
 indicator for the second task as our dependent vari
 able. Table 1 summarizes the cell means and stan
 dard deviations for this measure as well as collab
 oration as a function of intergroup competition and
 membership change.
 3 We later repeated all analyses excluding the ten con
 trol groups from the low competition condition. These
 results are virtually identical to those reported in Table 2
 and are available from the authors upon request. Given
 that the results were robust with different analytic strat
 gies, we decided to present the results based on the
 entire sample rather than disregarding the information
 collected in the control condition.
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 Test of Hypotheses
 Following previous research (Humphrey, Moon,
 Conlon, & Hofmann, 2004), we used hierarchical
 regression analysis to test for nonlinear interactive
 effects of intergroup competition on group creativ
 ity (Cohen, Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2003). We first
 introduced into a regression equation the two main
 effect variables (competition, membership change).
 To control for any linear interactive trends and for
 any simple quadratic trends, we then entered the
 linear interaction term (competition by membership
 change) in step 2, followed by the quadratic inter
 group competition term (competition squared) in step
 3. Finally, to test Hypothesis 1, we introduced the
 quadratic-by-linear interaction (competition squared
 by membership change) in the last step.
 Table 2 presents the results of the analysis. Hy
 pothesis 1 states that membership change moder
 ates the quadratic effects of intergroup competition
 on group creativity in such a way that the effects
 describe an inverted U-shaped function in the case
 of closed groups but a U-shaped function in the
 case of open groups. Supporting this hypothesis,
 the competition squared by membership change
 interaction term was statistically significant (? =
 1.78, f[64] = 2.75, < .01).
 In further support of Hypothesis 1, results of post
 hoc analyses (Aiken & West, 1991) revealed that in
 open groups, increasing competition had a negative
 effect on creativity at first but, after exceeding an
 intermediate level, resulted in elevated creativity
 (? = -1.77, ?[64] = -2.43, < .05, b = 0.03, f[64] =
 TABLE 2
 Results of Hierarchical Regression Analysis of
 Creativity on Competition, Membership Change, and
 Their Interactions3
 Creativity
 Independent Variables ? AR2 AF
 Step 1 .16 3.91*
 Intergroup competition 0.31**
 Membership change 0.21
 Step 2 .05 4.56*
 Intergroup competition X -0.42*
 membership change
 Step 3 .01 0.52
 Intergroup competition squared 0.34
 Step 4 .08 8.10**
 Intergroup competition squared X 1.78**
 membership change
 a = 70 groups. R2 and F for the model are .30 and 5.58**,
 respectively.
 * < .05
 ** < .01
 0.17, > .05, and b = 1.83, ?[64] = 2.53, < .05, at
 low, intermediate, and high levels of intergroup
 competition, respectively). However, with respect
 to closed groups, these analyses provided only par
 tial support for our arguments. Although increasing
 competition resulted in the expected increase in
 creativity, the hypothesized negative effect of high
 intergroup competition on creativity was not found
 [b = 1.44, ?[64] = 2.19, < .05, b = 0.59, ?[64] =
 3.40, < .01, and b = -0.26, ?[64] = -0.36, > .05
 at low, intermediate, and high levels of competi
 tion, respectively).
 In addition, planned comparisons suggested that
 closed groups were less creative than open groups
 at low levels of competition (b = -1.35, ?[64] =
 -3.88, < .01). At intermediate and high levels of
 competition, however, there were no differences
 between these groups [b = 0.53, ?[64] = 1.33, >
 .05, and b = -0.24, ?[64] = -0.58, > .05). Overall,
 then, these results partially support Hypothesis 1.
 Although intergroup competition had the predicted
 U-shaped effects on creativity in the case of open
 groups, we found limited support for the prediction
 that the effects of competition on creativity would
 describe an inverted U-shaped function in the case
 of closed groups. Rather, our results suggest that in
 these circumstances, the effects of intergroup com
 petition on creativity described the shape of an
 attenuated, inverted U: creativity increases were
 more pronounced at lower levels of competition
 than at higher levels. Figure 1 graphically repre
 sents this quadratic interaction.4, 5
 To supplement these results, we developed a sec
 ond indicator of creativity, number of highly cre
 ative ideas, by counting the number of ideas pro
 duced by a group that received a rating of 7 or
 higher on the creativity rating scale (i.e., a rating in
 the upper third of the scale; mean = 0.34, s.d. =
 4 Repeating the analysis reported in Table 2 using the
 creativity score derived from the first task as the depen
 dent variable revealed, as might be expected, no signifi
 cant main or interactive effects of membership change
 (p > .05).
 5 Although we emphasized the importance of produc
 ing ideas with a potential for implementation, we ac
 knowledge that previous research has frequently mea
 sured creativity by simply counting nonoverlapping
 ideas, irrespective of their originality or usefulness, or by
 averaging the creativity of all ideas produced by a group
 (e.g., Goncalo & Staw, 2006; Rietzschel et al., 2007). For
 reasons of comparability, we repeated the analysis pre
 sented in Table 2 using these indicators of fluency and
 average creativity. No statistically significant quadratic
 interaction between intergroup competition and mem
 bership change emerged in these analyses (p > .05).
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 FIGURE 1
 Quadratic Interaction of Intergroup Competition and Membership Change on Creativity
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 0.56) (Diehl & Stroebe, 1991; Goncalo & Staw,
 2006). Repeating the analysis using this count mea
 sure produced results that were virtually identical
 to those reported in Table 2 (? = 2.05, ?[64] = 2.05,
 < .01, for the interaction of competition squared
 and membership change).
 In keeping with previous research, we defined
 creativity as ideas that are both novel and poten
 tially useful. However, some research suggests that
 the dimensions of novelty and usefulness are not
 always aligned and are sometimes even negatively
 related (Beersma & De Dreu, 2005; Rietzschel, Ni
 jstad, & Stroebe, 2007). To explore the possibility
 that the observed effects were the result of either
 novelty or usefulness, we decomposed the overall
 creativity measure into these two subdimensions
 (i.e., raters evaluated each idea in terms of novelty
 and usefulness). Given our instruction for groups to
 develop ideas that were both novel and useful and
 for raters to evaluate only those ideas as highly
 creative that embodied both features, not surpris
 ingly, we found both dimensions to positively cor
 relate with each other (r = .40, < .01) as well as
 with creativity (r's = .78 and .82, < .01, for
 novelty and usefulness, respectively). Repeating
 the regression analysis for novelty and usefulness
 produced results that were virtually identical to
 those presented in Table 2 (? = 1.40, t[64] = 2.20,
 < .05, and ? = 1.53, ?[64] = 2.15, < .05, for
 novelty and usefulness, respectively). These results
 suggest that the observed effects were the result of
 both novelty and usefulness.
 To test Hypothesis 2, stating that collaboration
 would mediate the joint, quadratic effects of inter
 group competition and membership change on cre
 ativity, we employed the procedure outlined by
 Baron and Kenny (1986). We had already demon
 strated that the independent variables affected cre
 ativity as hypothesized (see Table 2). Second, we
 found that intergroup competition and member
 ship change also exhibited joint, quadratic effects
 on collaboration (? = 2.28, ?[29] = 2.20, < .05)
 and that the pattern of this interaction (see Table
 1 and Figure 2) was consistent with our theoretical
 arguments, albeit for a sample of 35 groups. In
 addition, the mediating variable related positively
 and statistically significantly to creativity (? =
 0.35, ?[28] = 2.18, < .05). Lastly, when we con
 trolled for the effects of collaboration, the statisti
 cally significant quadratic effects of intergroup
 competition and membership change on creativity
 became statistically nonsignificant (? = 0.61, ?[28]
 = 0.63, > .05). This reduction approached statis
 tical significance according to SobePs (1982) test
 (Z = 1.55, = .06), suggesting mediation and pro
 viding some support for Hypothesis 2.
 DISCUSSION
 Given the increasing reliance of organizations on
 various forms of intergroup competition to stimu
 late the production of creative ideas in groups and
 the trend toward more fluid, project-based groups,
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 FIGURE 2
 Quadratic Interaction of Intergroup Competition and Membership Change on Collaboration
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 in the present study we set out to examine the joint
 effects of intergroup competition and membership
 change on group creativity. Specifically, we hy
 pothesized that the effects of intergroup competi
 tion on group creativity in closed (no membership
 change) groups, although positive up to intermedi
 ate levels, would become negative once such levels
 have been exceeded, resulting in an inverted U
 shaped function. In addition, we hypothesized that
 the effects of intergroup competition on creativity
 in open (membership change) groups, although
 negative up to intermediate levels, would become
 positive at higher levels, resulting in a U-shaped
 function. In addition, we examined collaboration
 as a mediator of these effects.
 In line with our general line of theorizing, we
 found that the effects of intergroup competition on
 group creativity were indeed contingent upon
 membership change and level of competition. Spe
 cifically, supporting Hypothesis 1, results revealed
 that open groups declined in their creativity as
 competition increased from low to intermediate,
 because of problems associated with cutthroat co
 operation. This negative trend, however, was re
 versed once competition exceeded intermediate
 levels and became increasingly fierce; the expected
 U-shaped function resulted. Thus, in keeping with
 our extension of structural adaptation theory, it
 appears that although at lower levels of competi
 tion, the negative consequences of a new member
 joining a group may outweigh the benefits of inter
 group competition, the opposite is true once compe
 tition becomes fierce. Facing fierce intergroup rivalry
 provides groups struggling with cutthroat coopera
 tion with the impetus to expend the effort and energy
 necessary to reconfigure the within-group structural
 arrangement to accommodate a newcomer and to
 thereby harvest the creative benefits typically associ
 ated with the arrival of a new member.
 In addition, results confirmed our arguments that
 closed groups' creativity would benefit from in
 creasing competition, but only up to an intermedi
 ate level of intensity. However, we found no sup
 port for our refinement of the implications of social
 interdependence theory that such groups, once
 competition exceeded intermediate levels, will ex
 perience a decline in their creativity resulting in an
 inverted U-shaped function. Rather, our results
 suggested that in these circumstances, the effects of
 intergroup competition on group creativity de
 scribed the shape of an attenuated, inverted U;
 creativity increases were more pronounced at
 lower levels of competition than at higher levels.
 One possible explanation for this latter finding is
 that despite our efforts to induce high levels of
 intergroup competition, we only partially suc
 ceeded in doing so. Specifically, although our
 manipulation check revealed that we successfully
 induced three different levels of intergroup compe
 tition, and although competition in the high-level
 condition appeared to be fierce enough to over
 come the negative consequences associated with
 cutthroat cooperation in open groups, it may be
 that it still was not fierce enough to cause partici
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 pants in closed groups to feel threatened and, thus,
 the predicted, negative effects of competition never
 emerged. Although there is some support for this
 argument, the joint effects of competition and
 membership change on collaboration suggest that
 closed groups did suffer from restricted collabora
 tive idea generation and a centralization of deci
 sion-making authority when operating in a fiercely
 competitive environment.
 Another possible explanation is that increasing
 intergroup competition has benefits, in addition to
 those captured by our mediator, that may have
 offset the decline in collaboration in closed groups
 as competition increased from intermediate to
 high. In other words, it is possible that other medi
 ating mechanisms, in addition to the one assessed
 in the present research, may be responsible for
 transmitting the joint effects of intergroup compe
 tition and membership change on group creativity.
 Evidence for this possibility can be found in our
 mediational analysis. Although collaboration ap
 pears to have been responsible for some of the
 effects we observed (that is, the reduction in the
 regression coefficient associated with the interac
 tion of competition squared by membership change
 approached statistical significance), the coefficient
 was not zero, indicating that some additional
 mechanisms may have been operative. Future re
 search could address this issue by identifying sup
 plementary mediators transmitting the effects ob
 served in this study.
 Our results highlight the importance of collabo
 ration not only for the production of creative ideas
 (Gilson & Shalley, 2004), but also as a mediator of
 the effects of intergroup competition and member
 ship change on group creativity. Thus, the present
 research extends previous work on social interde
 pendence theory and structural adaptation theory
 by establishing collaboration, particularly, collabo
 rative idea generation and decision making, as a
 mechanism underlying differences in creativity at
 different levels of competition and in both closed
 and open groups. Although this finding is consis
 tent with our theoretical arguments and previous
 research suggesting that collaboration in the form
 of information sharing mediates the effects of com
 petition/collaboration on general performance
 (Johnson et al., 2006), the results of our mediation
 analysis should be interpreted with some caution.
 Because of the malfunction of one of the video
 recording devices, we only had data for 35 of our 70
 groups, and our results may have been different
 had we been able to code the interactions of all 70
 groups. In addition, because our sample size was
 relatively moderate, given the complex set of pre
 dictions, we cannot rule out the possibility that
 sampling error may have affected the pattern of
 results observed in this study. Both of these issues
 potentially limit the robustness of our findings,
 thereby creating a need for future research to rep
 licate our results. Thus, we call for future research
 to reexamine the joint, quadratic effects of inter
 group competition and membership change on
 both within-group collaboration and group creativ
 ity using larger sample sizes and producing more
 complete information on the relevant mediating
 mechanisms transmitting the effects.
 Limitations
 Our study has a few additional limitations that
 are worth noting. First, our use of a laboratory
 setting involving undergraduate students raises
 questions about the external validity of our find
 ings. However, the generalizability of any study is
 determined not by its setting but by how well it
 captures the necessary dimensions of that setting
 (Campbell, 1986). Although we attempted to opera
 tionalize competition and membership change in
 ways reflective of the real world, it may be that we
 did not capture all of the necessary dimensions.
 Future research is needed to investigate the gener
 alizability of our results beyond the laboratory and
 the undergraduate student population.
 Next, our conceptualization and measurement of
 creativity as referring to a group's most creative
 ideas may also limit the generalizability of our re
 sults. Despite research suggesting that intergroup
 settings such as ours have the potential to spur
 motivational gains that have direct implications for
 the sheer number of ideas groups generate (e.g.,
 Lount & Phillips, 2007), and despite previous work
 that has measured creativity in terms of such flu
 ency or the average creativity of all the ideas gen
 erated by a group, additional analyses involving
 these measures produced no significant effects (see
 footnote 5). One explanation for our fluency results
 may involve our instructions. Going against tradi
 tional brainstorming instructions (Osborn, 1953),
 but following practice in some contemporary organ
 izations (Sutton & Hargadon, 1996), we did not
 explicitly encourage quantity but, rather, encour
 aged groups to focus their efforts on truly creative
 ideas with a potential for subsequent implementa
 tion. Thus, although our instructions may have fos
 tered a type of idea generation that mirrors the
 brainstorming found in contemporary organiza
 tions, they may also have curtailed fluency.
 Our analysis also failed to produce results for
 average creativity. This may appear surprising,
 given that average creativity and our measure of
 creativity were significantly correlated (r = .55, <
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 .01). One possible explanation may be that these
 groups, given our emphasis on highly creative
 ideas, combined some of their ideas or built upon
 them in an effort to develop truly creative ones.
 Given the potential for synergistic increases in cre
 ativity under these conditions (that is, the creativ
 ity of a group's most creative idea may be more than
 the average creativity of its component ideas), it
 is conceivable that the joint effects of competi
 tion and membership change were only observed
 when we considered a group's most creative idea.
 Future work is needed that examines the effects
 of competition and membership exchange on av
 erage creativity using alternative instructions.
 Nevertheless, as organizations typically assemble
 groups to foster the production of truly creative
 ideas rather than ideas of average creativity, our
 results do have important implications for organ
 izational practice.
 Next, the overall level of creativity in our study
 was modest; the average creativity of the groups'
 most creative contributions in all conditions was
 6.20 (s.d. = 1.04) on a 9-point scale. One reason for
 this modest outcome may again be our instructions,
 which highlighted the importance of ideas that
 were not only novel but also implementable. Al
 though our focus on both the novelty and useful
 ness components of creativity is consistent with
 our definition of creativity and with the conceptu
 alization of creativity embraced in contemporary
 research (see Shalley, Zhou, & Oldham, 2004),
 highlighting the usefulness component may have
 caused groups to dismiss ideas of greater originality
 but with little obvious or immediate potential for
 implementation, thereby restricting overall creativ
 ity levels. In addition, compared to brainstorming
 groups in organizations, our groups had less time
 available to develop their ideas. More time may
 have allowed groups to develop not only more
 ideas but also ideas of greater creativity. Thus, in
 the future researchers may want to extend the time
 available to groups to develop their ideas.
 Theoretical Implications
 Despite these limitations, our research has a
 number of theoretical implications. First, this study
 has advocated, and its results supported, a nuanced
 view of the effects of intergroup competition on
 creativity in groups. Specifically, the results sup
 port the view that the effects of intergroup compe
 tition on creativity vary not only as a function of the
 competitiveness of the intergroup environment, but
 also as a function of membership change. For exam
 ple, we found that for both open and closed groups,
 the effects of intergroup rivalry on group creativity
 described a nonmonotonic pattern (a U-shaped func
 tion in the open case and an attenuated, inverted
 U-shaped function in the closed case). These findings
 unambiguously suggest that a comprehensive under
 standing of the effects of intergroup rivalry on group
 creativity requires researchers to consider the nonlin
 ear effects of competition. Theories and models of the
 implications of intergroup competition therefore
 need to move beyond linear arguments to accommo
 date such nonlinear effects.
 By examining the nonmonotonic effects of com
 petition, the present study extends work on both
 social interdependence theory and structural adap
 tation theory. Refining the implications of social
 interdependence theory, our findings suggest that
 there are limits to the creative benefits that can be
 expected from instilling a cooperative mind-set via
 intergroup competition and that fierce rivalry (i.e.,
 intergroup competition increasing from interme
 diate to high levels) offers few added benefits and
 may even undermine creativity by constricting
 collaboration. Refining structural adaptation the
 ory, our findings suggest that problems associ
 ated with cutthroat cooperation are limited to
 circumstances in which competition between
 groups is moderate (i.e., competition increases
 from low to intermediate levels) and can be over
 come by creating a fiercely competitive inter
 group environment.
 Next, scholars have contended that the effects of
 intergroup competition on performance are contin
 gent on a number of factors, such as the perfor
 mance dimension of a task, the composition of a
 group, and the characteristics of individual group
 members (Beersma et al., 2003). For example, Beer
 sma et al. found that the collaborative benefits sug
 gested by social interdependence theory as emerg
 ing from the use of reward structures designed to
 facilitate intergroup competition only resulted in
 the expected performance increases when group
 performance was evaluated in terms of accuracy
 versus speed and when groups were composed of
 individuals likely to perform well in collaborative
 settings (i.e., individuals with high extraversion
 and agreeableness). Our research is consistent with
 and extends this contingency view of social inter
 dependence theory by suggesting that stability/
 change in membership composition may also play
 a vital role in regulating the effects of intergroup
 competition on different outcome variables.
 Finally, in keeping with previous work on the
 effects of membership change on group creativity
 (Choi & Thompson, 2005; Ziller et al., 1962), our
 results confirmed that open groups produced more
 creative ideas than closed groups in noncompeti
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 tive environments. Introducing a new member from
 a noncompeting group not only infuses a group
 with new perspectives but also provides the group
 with opportunities for social learning; the arrival of a
 new member may cause existing members to reflect
 upon and revise their work processes and ultimately
 result in the development of more effective task strat
 egies (Arrow & McGrath, 1993), thereby fostering cre
 ativity (Choi & Thompson, 2005). Although our open
 groups were significantly more creative than the
 closed groups in noncompetitive environments, these
 advantages vanished as the intergroup environ
 ment became increasingly competitive, mainly as
 a result of the closed groups now generating ideas
 of greater creativity. These results suggest that
 theories of membership change must move be
 yond a straightforward change-promotes-creativ
 ity logic to incorporate intergroup environment
 as an important factor shaping the effects of mem
 bership change on creativity.
 Practical Implications
 Our study also has a number of practical impli
 cations. Specifically, the findings suggest that the
 use of intergroup competition to stimulate the cre
 ativity of groups requires managers to calibrate
 competition with whether groups are likely to en
 counter membership change. Our results suggest
 that open groups are unlikely to benefit from inter
 group competition and may even experience de
 clines in creativity when such competition is lim
 ited to intermediate intensity. However, open
 groups in a competitive environment are an organ
 izational reality, especially in organizations that
 depend on the introduction of new products and
 services. Specifically, as the production of new
 products and services is typically the result of a
 process consisting of multiple stages (e.g., Cooper,
 2001; Leenders et al., 2007), in between which
 group composition may change to accommodate the
 changing requirements for expertise, it is not uncom
 mon for members of a previously competing team to
 join a new team during the later stages of the innova
 tion process. Our results suggest that such competi
 tion during the early stages of the process may have
 the potential to undermine creativity during subse
 quent stages, at least in cases in which competition is
 of moderate intensity. Thus, as a rule of thumb, we
 would suggest that when faced with fluid, project
 based groups involved in innovative pursuits, man
 agers avoid using intergroup competition as a pri
 mary vehicle for promoting creativity.
 Our results regarding the effects of intergroup
 competition on the creativity of open groups may
 also have organization-level implications. Compa
 nies frequently acquire or merge with other or
 ganizations in their industry to gain competitive
 advantage. When such organizations share a some
 what competitive past, however, our research sug
 gests that these mergers and acquisitions (M&A) are
 unlikely to produce the intended returns, partially
 because of the restricted collaboration and creativ
 ity that are likely to emerge as a result of problems
 associated with integrating members from a previ
 ously competing entity. Thus, organizational lead
 ers should not underestimate the difficulties and
 adverse effects on collaboration and creativity that
 result from M&A activities involving former com
 petitors (Johnson et al., 2006).
 When group membership is stable, however, en
 gaging groups in some form of intergroup competi
 tion has clear benefits. Nevertheless, managers
 should keep in mind that only intermediate levels
 of competition are required to stimulate elevated
 creativity and that creating a fiercely competitive
 environment offers few added benefits (and per
 haps even costs, as indicated by our findings re
 garding collaboration). In addition to constricting
 within-group collaboration and, potentially, cre
 ativity, intense intergroup competition may also
 lead to costs that are more indirect, by stifling col
 laboration between groups or subunits. That is, an
 imosity between competing groups is likely to un
 dermine the free flow of information and other
 important resources between these entities. How
 ever, as group creativity depends, at least to some
 extent, on the accessibility of resources provided
 by other groups or units (e.g., Ancona & Caldwell,
 1992; Wong, 2004), intergroup competition is likely
 to undermine creativity not only by constraining
 within-group collaboration but also by restricting
 collaboration between groups and units. In addi
 tion, to the extent that the achievement of organ
 izational goals depends on the collaborative ef
 fort of all groups or units in an organization,
 intergroup competition is also likely to nega
 tively impact organization-level performance.
 Thus, the benefits associated with intergroup com
 petition may easily be outweighed by its costs, even
 in more stable environments, and we encourage man
 agers to carefully consider these costs and benefits
 before using competition to promote the creativity of
 their groups.
 Finally, our results also suggest that in noncom
 petitive environments, membership change is a
 valid mechanism for enhancing group creativity.
 Thus, organization leaders interested in stimulat
 ing group creativity in such circumstances may
 purposefully design interventions requiring groups
 to engage in regular membership exchange. How
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 ever, caution regarding the frequency and timing of
 such interventions has to be exercised, as member
 ship change in this study occurred only once and
 during a natural break point between two tasks and,
 thus, it could be that change that occurs frequently
 or in the middle of a task may prove to be too
 disruptive and ultimately undermine the creativity
 of groups (Choi & Thompson, 2005). Nevertheless,
 occasional membership change during natural
 break points appears to be a legitimate mechanism
 for boosting the creativity of ad hoc groups in non
 competitive environments.
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